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Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be 
Raised 
By Robert H. Lande* 
The conventional wisdom is that current antitrust damage 
levels are too high, lead to overdeterrence, and should be cut back. 
Althou~h most agree that threefold damages are fine, at least for 
cartels, the combination of treble damages to direct purchasers and 
another treble damages to indirect purchasers2 typically is denounced 
as duplicative, a "mess,,,3 or the equivalent of the use of "cluster 
bombs" on defendants.4 This article, however, will assert the 
opposite. This article will argue that, if the current antitrust damage 
levels are examined carefully, they do not even total treble damages, 
and overall are not high enough to deter antitrust violations 
optimally. 
Perhaps this debate can first start with a point of general 
agreement. It cannot reasonably be disputed that the current antitrust 
damages system is a confusing, inefficient patchwork.5 The current 
• Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and 
Director and Senior Research Scholar, American Antitrust Institute. The author 
would like to thank John Connor, Albert Foer, and Daniel Small for extremely 
helpful suggestions, and Caroline Miller for excellent research assistance. 
1 Some believe, however, that treble damages should be reserved for per se 
violations. See American Bar Association's Antitrust Remedies Task Force 
Legislative Proposal, Discussion Draft (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter ABA Discussion 
Draft]. 
2 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) held that only direct 
purchasers can sue for damages. Many states, however, subsequently passed state 
"Illinois Brick repealer" legislation. See Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser 
Litigation: ARC America's Chickens Come Home To Roost On The Illinois Brick 
Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1997). 
3 Davis, supra note 2, at 395. 
4 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust In The New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 935 
(2001). 
5 Professor Spencer Weber Waller termed it "incoherent." See Spencer Weber 
Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CmCAGO-I<ENT L. REv. 
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system is so illogical that it is easy to ridicule-indeed, no rational 
person ever would have designed it from scratch in its current form. 
So, it is not a surprise that many call for modification of some of the 
existing damages categories, for consolidation, simplification, and 
reform. 6 
Nevertheless, this article will show that, if it is examined 
carefully, the current antitrust "treble" damages remedy really only 
constitutes approximately single damages. Even the award of "treble" 
damages to both direct and indirect purchasers only equals double 
damages. Yet, a multiplier, such as three, is necessary if we are to 
deter anticompetitive behavior optimally. Far from being duplicative 
or excessive, the current total should be raised. 
I. Crucial Questions 
Moreover, there are two crucial questions that should be 
answered before the current antitrust damages system is changed. 
First, is there convincing evidence that, overall, the current 
combination of damage and fine levels is too high, that they 
constitute effective duplication or lead to overdeterrence? 
This article will argue that the answer to this question clearly 
is "no." There is no convincing evidence that the aggregate of direct 
purchaser damages, indirect purchaser damages, and the like 
produces damage levels so high that they have led to real duplication 
or overdeterrence. 
Of course, lawyers for plaintiffs and defendants can give 
anecdotes cutting in different directions. Defendants' lawyers can 
point to bad cases that received too much money,? while plaintiffs' 
lawyers can point to good cases that were dismissed or received far 
too little money. But, anecdotes from interested parties are not proof. 
Although I have been searching for more than a decade,8 I have never 
seen anyone analyzing the decisions of neutral finders of fact, 
including judges and juries, present a systematic pattern of evidence 
207, 209 (2003). 
6 See ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 1. 
7 Many of these anecdotes are true. Surely there have been many antitrust 
cases where the awarded damages were too high and other cases where no damages 
whatsoever should have been awarded. See Waller, supra note 5, for a discussion 
of possible examples of each type of case. 
S I have been searching for this evidence ever since I started work on an earlier 
article on damages. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really 
Single Damages, 54 OHIO STATE L.J. 115, 161-68 (1993). 
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demonstrating that, overall, the current damage levels either 
constitute effective duplication or lead to overdeterrence. Moreover, 
anyone seeking to change the current system should have the burden 
to show that currently there is a problem and that their solution can 
help fix this problem. This article will argue that not only has this 
burden not been met; if anything, the current overall damages level is 
too low. 
There is a second question we also should ask: is there any 
convincing evidence that any of the reform or simplification ideas 
currently being proposed would do so without lowering the overall 
amounts awarded? 
It is easy to simplify the existing antitrust damages system. If 
all we want is a simple, administratively efficient system without any 
confusion, complexities, duplication, or legal costs, this can be 
accomplished easily. We should repeal all of the antitrust laws. 
Suppose, however, we believe that effective antitrust laws are 
beneficial for the economy on the whole, and that effective remedies 
are necessary to deter future offenses optimally. Also assume this 
article is able to show there is no evidence that the total of the 
existing damages and fines is duplicative or too large from the 
perspective of optimal deterrence. Suppose this article even is able to 
show that the overall total should be raised. 
Then the issue becomes much more difficult. The goal then 
should become to design a damages system that will lead to at least 
as much deterrence as that provided currently, and at the same time is 
also more efficient, simpler, or saves administrative costs. If one does 
not include this deterrence requirement, however, then the ostensible 
quest for simplification could really just be a cleverly disguised way 
of reducing overall damage levels.9 And, as noted, this article will 
9 See, for example, the first discussion item tentatively promulgated by the 
ABA Antitrust Section's Damages Task Force in February 2004. ABA Discussion 
Draft, supra note 1. It would create a federal indirect purchaser cause of action by 
changing the existing cause of action for direct purchasers into one that allowed for 
both direct and indirect purchaser suits, in one action, where the total damages paid 
was threefold. It contains a presumption that the indirect purchasers would obtain 
the recovery, but the direct purchasers could attempt to overcome this presumption. 
If this proposal simply created a new federal damages provision, it would be 
desirable. A key question, however, is whether it might implicitly preempt existing 
state Illinois Brick repealer legislation. If so, it would have the effect of 
significantly lowering the overall deterrence offered by the current combination of 
direct and indirect purchaser laws. It would also be much simpler and more 
efficient, and mean that indirect purchasers, rather than direct purchasers, would be 
more likely to recover. 
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argue that this would be an undesirable outcome. If one wants to 
design a remedies system that achieves both a high degree of 
deterrence and simplicity, this is very difficult to do. 
We probably are better off with even a complicated and 
flawed damages system that at least provides a moderate level of 
deterrence, than with a simpler system that would lead to completely 
inadequate deterrence. Moreover, if someone does come up with a 
"reform" or "simplification" proposal that is likely to have the effect 
of reducing the total damages awarded, we should ameliorate this 
downward effect. 10 In fact, we should move in the opposite direction. 
Under this proposal, all plaintiffs, combined, in states that currently do not 
have an Illinois Brick repealer, would recover the same as they do today in the 
aggregate. In these states different purchasers would be likely to recover: the 
indirect purchasers would be more likely to recover, instead of the direct purchasers 
who recover today. But, the total paid to purchasers in states without Illinois Brick 
repealers would not change. 
By contrast, in states like California that currently have effective repealers, the 
total recovery would decrease dramatically if their laws were preempted. Under the 
current situation, nominal treble damages go to direct purchasers, and another 
nominal treble damages go to indirect purchasers. But, under this proposal, all 
purchasers, together, would only get nominal treble damages. So, for roughly half 
the states deterrence would diminish by approximately 50%. 
Since deterrence would remain the same in roughly half the states, and be 
harmed by 50% in the other half, the overall effect of this proposal would be to 
significantly decrease overall deterrence. However, since this article will show in 
Part II that the existing "treble damages" are really equal only to single damages, 
and are not nearly large enough for optimal deterrence, this is an undesirable result. 
An alternative way to view this is from the perspective of settlements, since 
most cases in this area settle. Instead of settlements in places like California of, for 
example, single damages for direct purchasers and another single damages for 
indirect purchasers, the ABA Discussion Draft would mean that there would only 
be one settlement, for single damages, which would be likely to go to the indirect 
purchasers. And, of course, these damages are only nominal, without adjustments 
for prejudgment interest, etc. Rather than raise the overall payouts to achieve 
optimal deterrence, this proposal would lower them. 
The only ways to be sure that the Discussion Draft would not lead .to a 
suboptimal level of deterrence would be to make absolutely certain that it would 
not preempt existing state laws, or to amend it in ways that ameliorate its 
downward effects on deterrence. For example, it should include a provision for 
prejudgment interest and some of the other proposals in infra note 10. As it was 
proposed, however, this "reform" or "simplification" proposal is likely to actually 
be a clever way to lower effective overall damage levels. 
10 Beneficial reform provisions, which are likely to lead to more nearly 
optimal deterrence, include the following: 
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If this article is able to provide convincing evidence that the existing 
damages levels are, overall, too low, then we should devise ways to 
raise the existing damages payouts. 11 
II. Does Real Duplication or Overdeterrence Exist? 
Perhaps the most common criticism of the current system of 
multiple enforcers and multiple remedies is that it could lead to 
payouts that are more than three times damages, and that this would 
constitute duplication and overdeterrence. Many argue that, while 
treble damages are fine, the current combination of treble damages 
for direct purchasers, plus another three for indirect purchasers, 12 plus 
disgorgement, plus the effects of state enforcement actions,13 plus 
1. Prejudgment interest should be awarded for direct purchasers, 
indirect purchasers, and in criminal fines. 
2. The existing four-year Statute of Limitations should be raised to 
eight years, the approximate life of the average cartel. See Lande, supra 
note 8, at 130-34. 
3. Include a provision that antitrust "damages" include the allocative 
inefficiency effects of market power, and a presumption that they are Y2 
or 'A as large as the transfer effects of market power. However, it might 
be appropriate only to permit State Attorneys General to sue for this 
damages item. 
4. Include a presumption that "umbrella effects" occurred-that prices 
rose as much for firms in the relevant market that are not members of 
the cartel as they did for cartel members. 
5. Provide that damages in class actions shall be figured on a class-wide 
basis, with damages awarded in proportion to the ratio of an 
individual's purchases or sales to that of the entire class. 
6. Every state should enact an effective Illinois Brick repealer. States 
with ineffective Illinois Brick repealers should strengthen them. 
II See the suggestions described supra note 10. 
12 Indeed, in theory treble damages could be paid to several layers of indirect 
purchasers. 
13 States are permitted to bring antitrust cases, perhaps due to Federalism 
concerns and a separation of powers idea, and perhaps for other reasons as well. 
For example, suppose the federal government, for philosophical reasons, decided to 
stop suing big businesses for antitrust violations. The states (and private plaintiffs) 
could help to fill the void, and would provide a counterbalance that would help 
avoid sharp swings in antitrust policy. Second, the federal enforcers' judgment 
might be flawed, and a second opinion can be useful. Third, without state enforcers 
we would have to increase federal enforcement budgets commensurately, and this 
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criminal fines of double the ¥.ain or loss, leads to overall damages of 
. sixfold, eightfold, or tenfold. 4 
However, the duplication argument is only a theoretical 
construct that has never occurred in the real world. I am not aware of 
even a single case where a cartel's total payouts have ever exceeded 
three times the damages involved-if these damages are figured 
properly. This is true because, if one examines antitrust's so-called 
"treble" damages remedy carefully, from the perspective of optimal 
deterrence, one will find that it is really at most only single 
damages. IS The "threefold damages" that the antitrust world takes for 
granted is a myth. 
The starting place of a fair discussion of the correct overall 
level of antitrust damage awards should be the analysis promulgated 
by Professor William Landes. 16 Landes convincingly showed that to 
h· . 117 d 18 th d f . ac leve optima eterrence e amages rom an antitrust 
might not occur. If federal budgets were not increased appropriately, antitrust 
enforcement would suffer significantly. Fourth, state enforcers sometimes might be 
better attuned to local facts than the federal enforcers. Fifth, from an organizational 
perspective, it is desirable to have an enforcement unit specifically protecting the 
consumers and economy of a particular state. Otherwise, these concerns could just 
get lost despite good intentions by the federal enforcers. For a more extended 
discussion of the benefits and costs of state antitrust enforcement see Robert H. 
Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State 
Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1047 (1990). 
14 See, e.g., Michael L. Denger, A New Approach To Cartel Enforcement 
Remedies Is Needed, ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting, at 15 (Apr. 24-26, 2002). 
15 See Lande, supra note 8. This is just an approximation. This article 
calculated that antitrust's "treble" damages remedy probably was actually between 
48% and 109% of actual damages. These figures also are just estimates. Id. at 160. 
See also Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust At The Tum Of The Twenty-First Century: The 
Matter of Remedies, 91 GEO LJ. 169, 171 (2002) ("Studies show that treble 
damages really amount approximately to single damages in most circumstances."). 
See also Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing In Private Merger Cases: 
Reconciling Private Incentives And Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 
1, n.91 (1995) ("In fact, treble damages turn out to be closer to single damages 
when current losses, litigation costs, and future recovery are discounted to present 
value."). See also Carlson & Erickson Builders v. Lampert Yards, 190 Wis. 2d 
650,667 (1995). For discussions of the deterrence and compensation nature of 
treble damages, see, e.g., Lande, supra note 8 (positing that "'treble damages' 
actually awarded are probably at most as large as the damages caused by the 
violation"). 
16 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions For Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 652, 656 (1983). 
17 Professor Landes carefully designed his approach so that it would not be too 
strict or too lenient. His goal was not to deter all violations. He only wanted to 
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violation should be equal to the violation's "net harm to others," 
multiplied by the probability of detection and proof. 19 This 
framework is almost universally accepted, even by those who are not 
of a Chicago School orientation.2o 
The multiplier used in calculating antitrust damages should be 
larger than one because not all violations are detected and proven. 21 
From the perspective of optimal deterrence, if damages and fines 
only total actual damages, firms would be undeterred from 
committing violations. For this reason most agree that there should be 
some kind of multiplier. If we only catch and successfully prosecute 
1/3 of all cartels, for example, then threefold damages are appropriate 
to achieve optimal deterrence.22 Of course, no one knows whether we 
catch more or less than 113 of all antitrust violations.23 But, since a 
deter violations when so doing would be efficient, and he wanted to permit efficient 
breaches of the antitrust laws. Id. 
18 Professor Landes did not analyze compensation of victims. Even if we were 
concerned with compensation, however, it would make little difference in the 
outcome. See Lande, supra note 8, at 161-68. Moreover, there is widespread 
agreement over the need optimally to deter future violations, while the 
compensation argument is more controversial. 
Currently, direct purchasers are compensated even if they pass some or most of 
the overcharges to their own customers. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). Indirect purchasers, however, only are compensated if 
their state has an effective Illinois Brick repealer. 
19 See Landes, supra note 16, at 666-68. 
20 See Lande, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
21 "Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be 
violators when unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. Indeed, 
some multiplication is necessary even when most of the liability-creating acts are 
open and notorious. The defendants may be able to conceal facts that are essential 
to liability." Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. ECON. 445, 
455 (1985). 
22 If a cartel overcharges by $1.00, but there is less than a one-in-three chance 
that it will be caught and convicted, then it would be rational for the cartel to 
attempt to break the law unless the penalty is $3.00 or more. A full analysis of the 
issue, however, becomes very complicated. See Landes, supra note 16. 
23 Some might argue that there currently is overdeterrence-that today almost 
every anticompetitive cartel is caught and successfully prosecuted, and the current 
damage actions mean that innocent companies are being harassed and almost 
blackmailed by unscrupulous plaintiffs. For an insightful discussion of this issue, 
see Jonathan B. Baker, New Horizons in Cartel Detection, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
824 (2001). If this were true, then a lower damages level would be appropriate. 
The continued high number of Department of Justice ("DOl") grand juries 
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multiplier of more than 1 is appropriate, and no one can demonstrate 
that antitrust should instead use a multiplier of 2 or 4, we usually 
assume, without much evidence,24 that only 113 of all cartels are 
indicates, however, that a lot of cartels still exist. As of February 2004, the DOJ 
had approximately 100 pending gmnd jury investigations, 50 of which involved 
suspected international cartel activity. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
STATUS REpORT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST 
DIVISION'S CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (2004), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/202531.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). 
The DOJ and a large number of gmnd juries clearly believe there are a lot of cartels 
that still exist. Between 1993 and 2002, the DOJ opened from 19 to 51 grand jury 
investigations per year, most of which resulted in convictions. ANTITRUST DIV., 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 1991-2002, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/12848.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). The 
following table shows the DOl's success in prosecuting antitrust violations: 
Total 1993 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 2000 '01 '02 
Criminal 
Cases 
Filed 84 57 60 42 38 62 57 63 44 33 
Won 73 51 65 38 40 64 48 52 38 37 
Lost 3 4 2 5 1 1 2 - 2 1 
Pending - - - - - 17 24 35 39 34 
Appeal 7 9 7 6 4 6 - - 5 1 
Decisions 
[d. 
If there had been little or no effective price fixing during this period, the DOJ 
has been fooling a lot of gmnd juries, judges, and juries. During the last four years, 
over 80 years of imprisonment have been imposed on antitrust offenders, with more 
than 30 defendants receiving jail sentences of one year or longer. ANTITRUST DIV., 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATUS REpORT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 
(2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineS/202531.htm (last visited Apr. 
27, 2004). In 2002 defendants in cases prosecuted by the Antitrust Division were 
sentenced to a record number of jail days, more than 10,000 in all. [d. In 2003, the 
avemge jail sentence reached a record high of 21 months. /d. 
24 In 1986 the Assistant Attorney Geneml for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg, 
estimated that the enforcers catch less than 10% of all cartels. See United States 
Sentencing Commission: Unpublished Public Hearings, 1986 volume, at 15 (July 
15,1986 Hearing). If he is correct, damages for cartels should be tenfold! However, 
the percentage of cartels that are caught and proven probably is much higher today. 
See Gary R. Spmtling, Detection and Deterrence, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 798, 
817-23 (2001). There is, however, no evidence that it exceeds 1/3, so there is no 
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detected and proven, and therefore, a multiplier of 3 is appropriate.25 
Optimal damages therefore are assumed to be equal to the net harm to 
others times 3. 
This, of course, leads to the question-what are the "net 
harms to others" from, for example, a cartel? These harms include the 
wealth transferred from consumers to the cartel caused by market 
power-which is, of course, the measure of damages in treble 
damages actions. But many other factors should also be included. 
First, damages should be adjusted for the time value of 
money. There is extensive data which suggests that the average cartel 
probably lasts 7-8 years, with an additional 4 plus year lag before 
judgment.26 Taking this factor into account, by itself, probably means 
that so-called "treble" damages are really only approximately double 
damages.27 
The allocative inefficiency harms from market power-the 
deadweight loss welfare triangle28-are a second "net harm to others" 
reason to believe that the treble damages remedy should be lowered. See Lande, 
supra note 8, at 115 n.1. 
25 Few quarrel with three as the multiplier for cartel cases. Some would, 
however, lower the multiplier for rule of reason cases. See ABA Discussion Draft, 
supra note 1. 
26 See Lande, supra note 8, at 130-34. 
27 /d. at 134-36. These calculations showed that for 1972-1991, a period of 
relatively high inflation, this factor alone meant that "treble damages" were really 
only between 1.65 and 1.25 times actual damages. However, today's lower interest 
rates would produce a lower adjustment. 
28 The reason why monopoly power causes a suboptimal use of societal 
resources is relatively straightforward: 
To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive level. 
The goods no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers than 
they would cost society to produce. This foregone production of goods 
worth more than their cost is pure social loss and constitutes the 
"allocative inefficiency" of monopoly. For example, suppose that 
widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of production 
plus a competitive profit). Suppose a monopolist would sell them for 
$2.00. A potential purchaser who would have been willing to pay up to 
$1.50 will not purchase at the $2.00 level. Because a competitive 
market would have sold the widgets for less than they were worth to 
him, the monopolist's reduced production has decreased the 
consumer's satisfaction without producing any countervailing benefits 
for anyone. This pure loss is termed "allocative inefficiency." 
Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of 
Antitrust, 33 ANTrrRUST BULL. 429,433-34 n.17 (1988). See also E. MANSFIELD, 
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from cartels.29 Yet, they apparently have never been awarded in an 
antitrust case. 30 This omission is significant. To oversimplify, Judge 
Frank Easterbrook made a number of standard assumptions and 
calculated that, due to the omission from damage awards of this 
factor alone, "'[t]reble damages' are really ~only] double the starting 
point of overcharge plus allocative loss .... " I 
Third, the umbrella effects of market p,0wer are another 
virtually unawarded damage from market power. 2 For example, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") never 
produced even 70% of the free world's supply of oi1.33 Yet, when 
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th ed. 1982) (providing 
an extended discussion and formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative 
inefficiency). 
29 See Lande, supra note 8, at 119-21. "[I]f the measure of liability is the 
excess of the monopoly price over the competitor price, times the number of units 
sold, it is necessary to include some multiplier in order to bring the allocative 
welfare costs of the violation home to the violator. Extracting the overcharge is not 
enough; the penalty must induce the putative offender to compare the allocative 
loss against any gains in productive efficiency, and that occurs when the sanction 
includes the full measure of the allocative loss." Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 455. 
30 See David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages For 
Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 505 (1991). I am unaware of either 
a more recent article on the subject or any case where plaintiff has received 
damages for the allocative inefficiency harms of market power. 
31 Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 455. Judge Easterbrook's standard, yet 
simplified assumptions might, however, have resulted in too large an estimate. As 
he notes: 
In the simple'case of linear demand and supply curves, the allocative 
loss is half the monopoly overcharge, so a multiplier of 1.5 is in order. 
These curves doubtless are not linear, but legal rules must be derived 
from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation. The 
multiplier of 1.5 thus may be a rough approximation of the lower 
bound. It takes care of the fact the nonbuyers do not recover 
damages. A further multiplier is necessary to handle the improbability 
of proving liability. As uncertainty and the difficulty of prosecution 
increase, so should the multiplier. From the violator's perspective, 
"treble" damages really are double the starting point of overcharge plus 
allocative loss, and thus trebling the overcharge is appropriate when the 
change of finding and successfully prosecuting a violation is one in 
two. 
/d. at 454-55. 
32 See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW para. 337.3 
(Supp. 1992) for a discussion. 
33 See MOHAMMED E AHRARI, OPEC: THE FAILING GIANT 203 (1986). 
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OPEC raised prices, prices also increased for the oil sold by non-
cartel members.34 Moreover, the price of fuels that were partial 
substitutes for oil, such as coal, uranium, and natural gas, also rose.35 
The so-called "treble damages" multiplier should be adjusted for this 
factor as well to account for the net harms to others from 
. . . .. 36 
antIcompetItI ve actIvIty. 
Moreover, there are five more adjustments to the so-called 
"treble damages" multiplier that should be made to calculate the net 
harms to others from an antitrust violation?? These eight adjustments, 
combined, show that even those cases that supposedly award "treble 
damages" probably only really award damages equal to, at most, one 
times the actual harms caused by the violation.38 As noted, however, 
from the perspective of optimal deterrence damages really should be 
at the threefold level. For this reason this article is titled, "Why 
Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised." 
III. Other Considerations 
Most damage cases are settled by negotIatIOn, with the 
plaintiffs, of course, asking for "treble damages.,,39 However, the 
analysis in Part II demonstrates that the starting point for these 
negotiations is only 1/3 as high as it should be. Instead of starting at 
real treble damages and negotiating down to, for example, single 
damages, the parties have actually been starting at roughly single 
damages and then negotiating down to perhaps only 1/3 of the 
violation's true damages. For this reason most settlements lead to 
inadequate deterrence. 
34 Id. 
35 See GEORGE L. PERRY, THE UNITED STATES, IN HIGHER OIL PRICES AND 
THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM 102 (Edward R. Fried & 
Charles L. Schultze eds., 1975). 
36 It probably would be practical, however, only to account for allocative 
inefficiency occurring within the relevant market that is the subject of the antitrust 
violation. 
37 The omitted five factors are: (1) effects of the Statute of Limitations; (2) 
uncompensated plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs; (3) the uncompensated value 
of plaintiffs time spent pursuing the case; (4) the costs of the judicial system; and 
(5) tax effects. See Lande, supra note 8, at 129-158. 
38 Id. at 158-60. 
39 Very few antitrust damages actions result in a verdict. See John M. Connor 
& Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices: Implications For Reform 
Of The Sentencing Guidelines (2004) (draft article, on file with the author). 
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Some antitrust violations also result in criminal fines. 4o If 
these were added to the totals from the private damages actions, the 
actual overall level of payouts would rise dramatically,41 but would 
still rarely reach the true threefold level.42 The criminal penalties 
imposed almost always utilize the statutory maximum of "twice the 
gross gain or twice the gross 10ss,,,43 which the DOl almost always 
approximates as 20% of the defendant's affected sales instead of 
double the actual gain or 10ss.44 However, the supposed standard of 
20% of defendant's affected sales often is negotiated downwards 
substantially,45 and is not adjusted to present value.46 Nevertheless, 
including criminal fines of double the actual gains or losses could 
raise the effective deterrent on hard core cartels from a nominal three 
or six (if damages to both direct and indirect purchasers were 
awarded) up to as much as a nominal eightfold damages.47 This 
40 See generally Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter 
and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693 (2001). 
41 In addition, many per se and rule of reason antitrust cases do not lead to 
criminal fines. This analysis, however, ignores the deterrent effects of jail 
sentences, which can sometimes be significant. 
42 This conclusion only considers the costs and benefits to the cartel that occur 
within the United States. International considerations would complicate the 
analysis. There is no foreign regime with damage and fine provisions as tough as 
those of the United States. Moreover, if European fines were considered as a cost to 
the cartel, then in fairness we also should include the overcharges to European 
consumers. Doing this would make the total underdeterrence even greater for 
international cartels. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush, et aI., 
Empagran, SA v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. (Mar. 15, 2004) (No. 03-724), 
available at 2004 WL 533933. 
43 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1994). Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency and 
Amnesty, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 715, 724 (2001).· 
44 Kobayashi, supra note 43, at 720-721. 
45 Id. at 724-25. 
46 Id. at 722-28. See also 18 U.S.c. § 3571(d); Spratling, supra note 24, at 
803-08. See generally Baker, supra note 40. 
47 One even could ask why we do not just use criminal sanctions and other 
federal prosecutions. This also brings up the issue of the extent to which we trust 
"big brother" in Washington to take care of us. The DOJ's dramatic shift in the 
Microsoft case under the Bush administration to a stance that was far less 
aggressive illustrates how political antitrust prosecutions sometimes can be. 
Moreover, the Clinton administration initiated the programs that are leading to 
huge fines against large international companies. See Baker, supra note 40, at 700-
01. Who can predict what future administrations will do? In addition, criminal 
antitrust violations must, of course, be proven to a much more stringent standard. 
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figure should then be adjusted downward by the factors discussed 
earlier, however, which would bring the true total down to 
approximately treble damages. 
Considering the necessary adjustments, however, I have never 
heard of even a single example of a cartel really paying more than 
threefold damages and fines in tota1.48 Moreover, I have never even 
heard of a single example of a cartel paying even true treble damages. 
I challenge the reader to produce even a single real world example of 
the sixfold or eightfold damages of lore! But, the catch is that a 
neutral party-a judge, a jury, or an administrative agency-should 
be the one to conclude that the damages were actually sextuple or 
octuple. Defense lawyers almost always assert that their clients never 
raised prices, so even a $1 settlement would constitute an infinite 
ratio of damages to actual injury.49 But plaintiffs would, of course, 
We want anticompetitive actions deterred optimally even if we are not sure enough 
to put someone in jail. 
48 Even the cartels that have paid the most in history-the Vitamin cartels-
have paid less than one times their overcharges in damages and fines total, and this 
does not even adjust for lack of prejudgment interest. See Brief of Amici Curiae of 
Professors Darren Bush, et al. at 4, Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. 
(Mar. 15, 2(04) (No. 03-724) ("This research demonstrates that the international 
vitamin cartel generated the largest total of antitrust fmes and penalties in history, 
which are calculated to be between $4.4 and $5.6 billion. But the cartel's monopoly 
profits in all areas of the world were $9 to $13 billion."), available at 2004 WL 
533933. 
Not surprisingly, others disagree with this conclusion. Professor Waller 
calculated that for the total of damages and fines, for both the United States and 
abroad, "the total ratio of punishment to harm begins to approach seven to one. 
Even adjusted for the lack of prejudgment interest [and the other factors noted in 
Lande, supra note 8] .... one is likely to end with a ratio of substantially higher 
than three to one." Waller, supra note 5, at 221-25. The amicus brief, however, 
used more recent information. 
Defendants no doubt would assert that still a different ratio was appropriate. 
But, the crucial point is that no judge, jury, or other neutral fact finder has ever 
found facts that support the assertion that the total payouts in the vitamins cartels 
exceeded three times its damages. 
49 Under this view many or most private cases are rent-seeking blackmail 
involving greedy, unscrupulous plaintiff lawyers. Surely this does occur, and many 
people can give examples that, in their opinion, qualify as "legalized blackmail." 
Although judges are supposed to prevent this from occurring, they often lack the 
resources or expertise to identify these situations. Anecdotes from non-neutral 
parties, however, are not proof of a pattern. 
Out of fairness, moreover, a counter-anecdote might be instructive. The 
NASDACQ class action litigation settled for $1.027 billion, plus interest, which 
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make very different assertions. Respectfully, defendants (like 
plaintiffs) are not neutral sources.50 
This same challenge has been issued in many public fora to 
many defense lawyers over the years, but none has ever been able to 
name even one real case involving actual damage levels that 
exceeded the threefold level for a cartel or monopoly. Yet, only a 
pattern of such evidence might justify damages reform that lowered 
the overall levels of antitrust damages. 
Instead, the following scenario is more typical. Assuming that 
plaintiff can get the class certified, defendants might negotiate a 
settlement with direct purchasers of, say, nominal single damages. 
They might also negotiate a settlement with indirect purchasers (from 
many of the 25 or so states that permit indirect purchaser suits) that 
was distributed to more than a million class members. According to plaintiffs' 
attorney, this represented roughly single damages. The total of attorneys' fees, 
litigation expenses, class notice costs, and settlement administration expenses was 
$131 million. Payments to victims totaled $896 million in cash, not coupons or 
discounts. This was 87% of the total settlement. Atypically, this was a case where 
the private plairitiffs took the lead and the government followed. There would have 
been no deterrence, no compensation, and no beneficial future effects on the 
market, if not for the actions of the plaintiffs and their lawyers. See Arthur M. 
Kaplan, Antitrust As A Public-Private Partnership: A Case Study a/the NASDACQ 
Litigation, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 111, 129 (2001). 
For an overview of "numerous scenarios in which defendants that engaged in 
illegal activity receive no punishment whatsoever for their conduct" see Waller, 
supra note 5, at 230-33. 
50 How might some respond to my challenge to provide even a single cartel-
let alone a pattern of cases-where the total effective overall payouts have 
exceeded three times the damages caused by the cartel? They might say the 
following, which the author has heard in a variety of forms from defendant counsel 
on many occasions: "My clients did not try to fix prices, and even if they tried, they 
never succeeded, and at least not in an effective way. The cartel failed to affect 
price levels because effective collusion is so difficult in our industry. I have an 
economist who will so testify (in fact, I have several). It is true that we settled the 
case for millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars, but we did this just to 
avoid a crazy judge and/or jury. Therefore, in my case the real, effective mUltiplier 
was much more than three. In fact, it was infinity because, as I already told you, we 
did not affect price levels at all." 
There is, of course, a crucial problem with this argument. These are only the 
opinions of defense counsel, not of judges or juries. Respectfully, we cannot just 
take their word for their assertions. This is especially true when their clients were 
sent to jail for price fixing. Moreover, we know that some of their clients keep 
trying to fix prices, risking significant jail terms, fines, and private damages 
actions. Are these otherwise rational business people crazy? Or is collusion often 
profitable? 
2004] Raising Antitrust Damage Levels 343 
aggregate to no more than V2 of actual nationwide damages. To this 
should be added the criminal fines that, for a cartel, often are 
negotiated down to 1 or 1 Y2 times the supposed damages.51 These 
appear to total roughly treble damages for the cartel: 1 & Y2 & (l or 
1 Y2) = roughly 3. However, after adjustments are made for lack of 
prejudgment interest and the other factors described earlier, the 
effective total is likely to be much less than treble damages. Indeed, it 
certainly is not sixfold or eightfold, and probably only is single 
damages. 
Thus, the "duplication" or "overdeterrence" argument is only 
theoretical. No proponent of antitrust damages "reform" has ever 
cited a real world example. A fortiori, there is no reason to think that 
a pattern of such cases exists. However, true treble damages, even for 
rule of reason cases, 52 should be our goal. Accordingly, this article is 
titled, "Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised." 
51 See sources cited supra notes 23, 24, and 46 and accompanying text. 
52 It has sometimes been proposed that damages should be detrebled for rule 
of reason violations. See, e.g., ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 1. Such a regime, 
however, would lead to less deterrence then currently exists. It would also be more 
complicated and lead to less business certainty in light of the current uncertain line 
between per se and rule of reason antitrust violations. 
The rationale behind this proposal might be the idea that per se violations are 
much more likely to be anticompetitive than rule of reason cases, and that 
overdeterrence is much less of a serious risk for per se cases. See generally Baker, 
supra note 23. This surely is true. However, if rule of reason situations lead to 
antitrust violations and they also cause harms in addition to their transfer effects-
they are likely to cause allocative inefficiency and umbrella effects, they should be 
adjusted to present value, etc. So, a multiplier is still appropriate for rule of reason 
situations. 
The multiplier of three is used, presumably, because antitrust violations 
frequently are hard to detect and prove to be anticompetitive. Rule of reason cases 
on average probably are easier to detect, but they are much, much harder to prove 
than per se cases. There is therefore no reason why the same overall multiplier 
should not be used. 
One could even make a respectable argument that treble damages are more 
important in rule of reason cases. Treble damages probably were adopted in part to 
provide an incentive for private litigants to find and prove violations. Lande, supra 
note 8, at 122-29. Rule of reason cases are tremendously risky, protracted, and 
expensive. Abolishing treble damages in rule of reason cases could effectively 
destroy rule of reason private antitrust enforcement. The number of monopolization 
cases, vertical cases, etc. could decrease tremendously. 
Moreover, treble damages lead to greater attention by firms to the possible 
antitrust consequences of their actions. This leads to fewer violations. Even if 
"treble damages," when examined properly, are really single damages, if a firm 
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IV. Conclusions 
Most of the antitrust community concedes that damages 
should be trebled to achieve optimal deterrence, but then laments that 
the combination of threefold damages to direct purchasers and 
another treble damages to indirect purchasers is excessive. This 
conclusion, however, is based upon a myth. Antitrust's so-called 
"treble" damages are really only single damages. Even if a case 
actually yielded "treble" damage payouts to both direct and indirect 
purchasers, when viewed correctly this would be the equivalent of 
overall payouts that did not reach the threefold level. 
This article is not asserting that the current antitrust damages 
system is perfect or even that it is logical. Nor is this article 
defending every antitrust verdict in every individual case; surely, 
many are unjustified or excessive. This article started, moreover, by 
admitting that the current system is inefficient. The antitrust 
community should, of course, attempt to devise ways to make it 
simpler, more efficient, and more equitable. But, it must also make 
sure that the quest for "reform" is not a clever subterfuge or 
marketing device for a plan to lower the overall damages levels. 
In the name of "reform," we should raise the overall antitrust 
damage levels, not lower them. In reality, today the total damages 
plus fines paid by cartels and monopolies never exceed three. More 
often, the real effective total is only singlefold damages or less. In 
light of the fact that the current damages starting points are too low, 
the burden should be on those who propose reforms to demonstrate 
that their proposals would not cut back the overall award levels. 
Damage reform proponents should first have to demonstrate that their 
proposal will not lower the overall level of damages awarded. Only 
then could their proposal be considered an honest simplification or 
efficiency proposal. 
The current illogical and inefficient system of damages should 
thinks they might have to pay treble damages, this could deter them from engaging 
in anticompetitive conduct. Single damages combined with an unknown and 
uncertain, but significantly less than 100% probability of detection and litigation 
would provide a positive incentive to violate the law. 
Moreover, criminal penalties are irrelevant in rule of reason cases, so the 
private payouts have to supply all the necessary deterrence. In per se cases, by 
contrast, some of the optimal deterrence :vill be supplied by the criminal penalties. 
Instead of lowering damages for rule of reason cases, we should keep damages 
at three for rule of reason cases, and raise the levels for per se cases-so that 
damage awards in per se cases truly are trebled. See supra note 10 and 
accompanying text (providing suggestions on how this could be accomplished). 
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of course be reformed. But, we also should be sure not to lower its 
overall levels. In fact, if we are truly interested in deterring antitrust 
violations optimally, we should raise them. 
*** 
